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Containment is the term generally used to characterize American policy towards 
the USSR after the Second World War, when it consisted of a series of attempts 
to deal with the power and position won by the USSR in order to reshape postwar 
international order.1 Containment, as originally articulated by its chief architect, 
George F. Kennan, was always contested, for example because it did not clarify 
whether Soviet behaviour had strictly national or ideological roots, and would 
result in the USSR’s having the initiative about where and when to act.2 Nonethe-
less, throughout the Cold War it remained US policy, partly because of the failure 
in 1953–4 of the alternative, ‘liberation’ and ‘rollback’.3 Although containment 
changed and sometimes seemed to have broken down, for example in the Vietnam 
War, the imprint of Kennan’s ideas—perhaps more than anyone else’s—endured.4 
After 1989 it seemed that containment had no place in the peaceful multilateral 
environment which seemed to be emerging; however, it proved adaptable to a 
range of post-Cold War situations, including some which appear to have little 
in common with the context and goals of containment’s original formulation: 
among these are the challenges posed to US national security by the so-called 
rogue states.
The endurance of containment suggests that it possesses what Gaddis terms 
transferability: the capacity of a grand strategy from the past to transcend the 
circumstances that produced it to suggest what should be emulated and what 
avoided in future policy.5 Drawing on Gaddis’s claim and the methodology of 
structured, focused comparison between ‘deviant’ heuristic case-studies, which 
allow the testing of theory beyond traditional boundaries,6 this article uses 
Israel’s foreign policy towards Hezbollah and Hamas to demonstrate a hitherto 
* The author would like to thank Anastasia Nesvatilova, Christopher Coker, Gemma Collantes-Celador, Justin 
Rosenberg and Shani Orgad for their help with this article. The responsibility for any errors, of course, 
remains his own.
1 George L. Gaddis, Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 4.
2 See e.g. Walter Lippman, The Cold War: a study in US foreign policy (New York: Harper, 1947).
3 Christopher Coker, Relections on US foreign policy since 1945 (London: Pinter, 1989), p. 64.
4 Henry Kissinger, White House years (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979), p. 135; Gaddis, Strategies of 
containment, p. 25.
5 Gaddis, Strategies of containment, p. 380.
6 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 67–93.
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unexplored argument that containment is transferable (with some permutations) 
from state level to a relationship between states and territorial transnational actors 
(TNA). Territorial TNA, like other TNA, make ‘contacts, coalitions, and interac-
tions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy 
organs of government’.7 However, territorial TNA are distinctive in seeking to 
use some sort of territorial base; comprising well-organized politico-military 
organizations that pursue de facto foreign policies, they are thus formidable 
antagonists of individual states.8 The article contributes to the debate on contain-
ment by examining the under-researched9 topic of containing territorial TNA in 
relation to four issues: the circumstances producing containment; its applicability 
to territorial TNA; the objectives of containment; and the role of legitimacy as a 
component of containment.
The article is organized in three sections. The irst explores the ideas instilled 
by Kennan’s thinking in debates on containment during and after the Cold War, 
and acts as a theoretical matrix for evaluating Israel’s foreign policy.10 The second 
and third sections focus respectively on Israel’s foreign policy towards Hezbollah 
(2000–11) and Hamas (2006–11). The timeframes are based on the events marking 
the beginning of Israel’s containment policies towards Hezbollah and Hamas, and 
the Arab uprisings in the Middle East, which, because they are likely to change 
Israel’s foreign policy environment (though not necessarily its containment stance) 
in ways that cannot be foreseen at the time of writing, seem a useful endpoint for 
the analysis.
The examination demonstrates that Israel’s actions and use of foreign policy 
tools relect an internal logic that generated what I describe as limited containment 
and comprehensive containment. Limited containment is used to keep within conines 
the security threat posed by an adversary—measured in terms of frequency and 
lethalness of attacks sufered; comprehensive containment involves keeping within 
conines an opponent’s military challenge and using this containment to generate 
political change in the adversary.11
Containment during and after the Cold War
Scholars and policy-makers have debated what Kennan meant by containment. His 
notion became clearer following declassiication of National Security Council and 
Policy Planning Staf documents from 1947–9, and other material from the Cold 
7 Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, eds, Transnational relations and world politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), p. xi.
8 Christopher Hill, The changing politics of foreign policy (London: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 195–6.
9 Exceptions include Ian Shapiro, Containment: building a strategy against global terror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); Jonathan Stevenson, Counter-terrorism: containment and beyond, Adelphi Paper no. 367 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Otherwise, the debate on containment focuses on state containment.
10 Foreign policy is deined here as the external actions of an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations, intended to shape and manage its foreign relations. This deinition draws on Hill, The changing politics 
of foreign policy, p. 3.
11 This notion builds on Robert S. Litwak, Rogue states and US foreign policy: containment after the Cold War 
(Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), p. 105.
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War period.12 Kennan refers to a strategy rooted in a predominantly  pessimistic 
reading of international relations that is nonetheless optimistic about the possibili-
ties of restraining rivalries, based on an understanding that the alternative foreign 
policy options towards the USSR—appeasement, accommodation, outright 
war—would be dangerous, possibly deadly. Containment was underpinned by the 
assumption that the USSR was ridden with internal contradictions and politically 
and economically was exceedingly vulnerable. Kennan believed that the USSR 
contained the seeds of its own decay, and argued that steady pressure exerted 
over several years would lead to a mellowing of Soviet power and, possibly, its 
eventual breakup.13
To achieve this, Kennan suggested, the US possessed various foreign policy tools, 
which he referred to as ‘measures short of war’.14 These included economic ‘carrots 
and sticks’, diplomacy and military force, this last being considered particularly 
useful for making political positions credible, deterring attacks and encouraging 
allies. Military intervention was an option, though only under very particular 
circumstances. Other measures included fostering competition in the communist 
world and buttressing the capitalist economies to demonstrate Soviet shortcomings. 
Kennan argued that the more the USSR’s deiciencies were exposed, the greater 
would be the disintegrating and eroding efect of containment. Meanwhile, the 
carrot of a happier, more successful life than under Soviet rule would remove, or at 
least mitigate, the conditions for and prospects of communism’s spread, especially 
into Western Europe.15
Pressure through the use of multiple foreign policy tools was not aimed primarily 
at the USSR’s military threat; after the Second World War, it was assumed that the 
Soviets had neither the will nor the capability to launch a military strike against 
the United States. Containment was aimed mainly at curtailing the USSR’s ability 
to gain inluence via psychological and political means, particularly among its 
immediate neighbours.16 As the Cold War developed, this implied: restoring the 
balance of power in areas threatened by Soviet expansionism; reducing the scope 
of Soviet inluence through cautious exploitation of the antagonisms between 
Moscow and the international communist movement; and pursuing the long-run 
objective of altering the Soviet concept of international relations to facilitate a 
negotiated settlement.17
12 On this see John L. Gaddis, ‘Containment: a reassessment’, Foreign Afairs 55: 4, 1977, p. 87.
13 X, ‘The sources of Soviet conduct’, Foreign Afairs 25: 4, July 1947, pp. 566–82; George Kennan, ‘The structure 
of international power in the USSR’, in Giles Harlow and George Maerz, eds, Measures short of war: the George 
F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College 1946–1947 (Washington DC: National Defence Press Publications, 
1991), pp. 21–51; Charles Gati and Richard H. Ullman, ‘“X” plus 25 (1): interview with George F. Kennan’, 
Foreign Policy, no. 7, 1972, pp. 13–14; Charles Gati, ‘“X” plus 25 (2): what containment meant’, pp. 26–7; 
Gaddis, Strategies of containment, pp. 31, 386. 
14 George Kennan, ‘Measures short of war’, in Harlow and Maerz, eds, Measures short of war, pp. 3–21.
15 Shapiro, Containment, pp. 5–6; Gaddis, ‘Containment: a reassessment’, pp. 878–9; Gaddis, Strategies of 
containment, pp. 38–49.
16 George F. Kennan, Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 358; Gaddis, Strategies of containment, p. 34. On 
containment and the Soviet military threat, see Eduard Mark, ‘The question of containment: a reply to John 
Lewis Gaddis’, Foreign Afairs 56: 2, 1978, pp. 430–40.
17 On the progression of containment, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 
446–550; Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 354–67; Gaddis, ‘Containment: a reassessment’, pp. 881–2.
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However, Kennan was acutely aware of the need to maintain legitimacy; con -
tainment should not destroy what it sought to defend. Speciically, US  strategists 
were concerned that the efort to contain an authoritarian adversary should not 
challenge democracy through the imposition of a command economy or a garrison 
state, or abridgement of democratic procedures.18 International  legitimacy was 
of less concern in relation to the West since, as Buzan argues, US leadership was 
generally backed by a following of loyal allies and seen as preferable to Soviet 
domination.19
Thus, containment emerged in the context of the Cold War, and was employed 
by the United States towards a particular actor. Could it transcend these bounda-
ries? The test came with the end of the Cold War. Competition among the Great 
Powers was over. The world seemed to be moving towards multipolarity, greater 
diversity of actors and less hierarchy. The greater prominence of ethnic nation-
alism, terrorism and discord inside states as determinants of conlict implied that 
the sources of disorder in international politics were changing.20
Nonetheless, containment remained a tenet of US foreign policy, but towards 
a diferent type of actor—the so-called rogue states of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, 
Iraq and Libya. Despite their diferent histories, cultures, economies and geopolit-
ical positions, these countries were treated by US strategists as a single group, with 
emphasis placed on the challenges they posed to US national security: pursuit 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), use of terrorism as an instrument of 
state policy and the threat to western material interests in key regions.21 Contain-
ment was invoked to respond to these challenges, most systematically perhaps in 
the policy of dual containment towards Iran and Iraq.22 For almost a decade this 
policy exhibited some of Kennan’s key Cold War principles. For example, dual 
containment emerged as a third way between what were deemed the undesirable 
and even unviable foreign policy options towards Iran and Iraq of accommoda-
tion or total war. Relecting Kennan’s thinking, dual containment was designed 
to exert pressure to exacerbate the internal contradictions and vulnerabilities in 
these countries’ regimes, creating strains that would enforce mellowed behaviour 
and, eventually, might cause their collapse.23
To this end the United States employed multiple foreign policy tools, including 
the maintenance of alliances with states friendly to Washington that potentially 
could be afected by Iran and Iraq (for example, Turkey and the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council states) and diplomatic and economic measures, such as sanctions, 
to contain the political inluence of Iran and Iraq in the Gulf and the threat it 
18 Gaddis, Strategies of containment, p. 389.
19 Barry Buzan, ‘A leader without followers? The United States in world politics after Bush’, policy paper no. 2, 
Global Policy Institute, Nov. 2007, http://www.gpilondon.com/ileadmin/user_upload/GPI/Short_Policy_
Docs/PP2.pdf, accessed 17 May 2012. 
20 Litwak, Rogue states and US foreign policy, pp. 1–3.
21 Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting backlash states’, Foreign Afairs 73: 2, March/April 1994, p. 46; Litwak, Rogue states 
and US foreign policy, pp. 6–7.
22 On dual containment, see Garry Sick, ‘Rethinking dual containment’, Survival 40: 1, 1998, pp. 5–32; Patrick 
Clawson, ‘The continuing logic of dual containment’, Survival 40: 1, 1998, pp. 33–47; Litwak, Rogue states and 
US foreign policy, pp. 123–98.
23 Clawson, ‘The continuing logic of dual containment’, p. 33; Litwak, Rogue states and US foreign policy, p. 13. 
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posed to the material interests of the United States and its allies (for example, 
sanctions on Iraq following the 1990–91 Gulf War, and the August 1996 Iran–
Libya Sanctions Act).24 Echoing US policy towards the USSR, dual containment 
entailed the deployment of US military capabilities deemed suicient to deter 
or respond to aggressive acts from Iran and Iraq and to support US allies. Thus, 
following the 1991 Gulf War, America, Britain and France imposed two no-ly 
zones over Iraq. At the same time, the United States did not rule out engagement 
or a form of post-Cold War detente with the rogue states.
US containment towards rogue states difered from Kennan’s notion of 
containment in not being directed towards states that might exploit their ideolog-
ical appeal to people in other countries to take over their states. By the 1990s, 
even Iran’s revolutionary ambitions were signiicantly tempered by the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the enduring efects of the Iran–Iraq War, and the rise of 
the United States as the sole superpower.25 And containment after the Cold War 
was not articulated in the context of a strategic contest between two states at the 
systemic level, but was implemented to deal with the challenges rogue states posed 
to US national security, as noted above.26
Critics point to the gap between the goals and results of dual containment. 
Despite the intense pressure exerted on the Iran and Iraq regimes, neither changed 
its policies on issues that mattered to the United States: pursuit of WMD, support 
for terrorist groups and the use of state terrorism. Critics argued that dual 
containment was driven not by US interests, but by the political agenda of the 
then Republican-dominated Congress, and that it provoked unnecessary frictions 
between the United States and its allies in Europe and Japan. It was suggested that 
US imposition of extraterritorial sanctions was not upheld by international law 
and exacted a disproportionate commercial price.27 As the efects of sanctions 
became steadily more severe (particularly in Iraq), dual containment was increas-
ingly criticized on humanitarian grounds.28 Nevertheless, containment endured 
until it was replaced by war and pre-emption following the 9/11 attacks.29
The record of containment during and after the Cold War shows that, at state 
level, it encompasses what Gaddis terms ‘transferability’. Four transferable princi-
ples stem from the above account. First, containment arose as an alternative to 
other foreign policy options—accommodation or total war—deemed undesir-
able, dangerous or deadly. Second, the containing and contained entities (the latter 
being a revolutionary or a rogue state) had a common perception of risk which, at 
the most basic level, was the aspiration to survive as a political entity, and decision-
24 Litwak, Rogue states and US foreign policy, p. 5; Lake, ‘Confronting backlash states’, p. 46.
25 On these points, see Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘The foreign policy of Iran’, in Raymond A. Hinnebusch 
and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, The foreign policies of Middle Eastern states (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 
298–303.
26 Lake, ‘Confronting backlash states’, p. 46; Litwak, Rogue states and US foreign policy, pp. 6–7. 
27 On this subject, see Kenneth Katzman, Richard Murphy, Fraser Cameron, Robert Litwak, Gary Sick and 
Thomas Staufer, ‘The end of the dual containment: Iran, Iraq and smart sanctions’, Middle East Policy 8: 3, 
Sept. 2001, p. 76.
28 The point was made by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy, ‘Diferentiated 
containment’, Foreign Afairs 73: 2, 1997, pp. 20–31.
29 For the shift under Bush, see Shapiro, Containment; Stevenson, Counter-terrorism. 
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making frameworks for managing and responding to containment. Third, there 
was an assumption that internal contradictions and vulnerabilities existed in the 
target entity and that pressure on these states would exacerbate these tensions, 
prompting softened behaviour and possibly eventual collapse. Here, there is a 
diference between Cold War and post-Cold War containment. During the Cold 
War the United States used containment primarily to contain the USSR politi-
cally; after the Cold War it employed containment to deal with the challenges 
posed by rogue states to its national security. Fourth, containment needed to 
garner legitimacy. During the Cold War the main concern was that containment 
should be congruent with US domestic values; after the Cold War international 
legitimacy proved the greater concern.
As long as it abides by its transferable principles, then, containment can be 
applied in diferent international contexts, towards diferent types of actors: the 
USSR during the Cold War, rogue states after the Cold War. Using this account 
as a theoretical matrix, the following sections argue that Israel’s foreign policy 
towards Hezbollah and Hamas demonstrates that, with some rearrangements, 
containment is transferable from state level to state/territorial TNA level.
Containing Hezbollah
On 24 May 2000 Israel withdrew its forces unilaterally from the Security Zone 
in south Lebanon it had occupied since 1985,30 following the failure of Israeli–
Syrian negotiations to yield a peace treaty,31 and the growing perception among 
politicians, civil society groups and members of the public that Israel’s presence in 
the Security Zone was inefective.32 Subsequently, Israel indicated that its foreign 
policy towards Hezbollah would be based on two pillars. The irst of these was 
full implementation of the 1978 United Nations Security Council Resolution 
425, which called ‘upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against 
Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese 
territory’.33 Israel’s Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, judged that full implementation 
would deprive Hezbollah of the legitimacy to launch attacks across the Israeli 
border, and create ‘an invisible barrier between the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] 
and Hezbollah forces’.34 The second pillar was deterrence: Hezbollah and Syria 
were warned they would ‘bear the responsibility for any act of aggression or 
terrorism against Israel, and that the bar of Israel’s response will be high’.35
30 Ahron Bregman, Israel’s wars: a history since 1947 (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 260–73.
31 On the Israeli–Syrian peace talks, see Itamar Rabinovich, Waging peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948–2003 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004).
32 Amos Harel and Avi Issacharof, Spider webs (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2008), pp. 15–27, 31–4; E. Barak, 
testimony before the Winograd Commission, Final report ( Jerusalem: Winograd Commission, 2008), pp. 2–3.
33 UN Security Council Resolution 425, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/ 368/ 
70/IMG/NR036870.pdf?OpenElement, accessed May 2012. 
34 Barak, testimony before the Winograd Commission, p. 6. The PM acknowledged that the disputed Shebaa 
Farms were not included in this category. 
35 Barak, testimony before the Winograd Commission, pp. 5, 8; Winograd Commission, Interim report ( Jerusalem: 
Winograd Commission, 2007), p. 44.
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Hezbollah continued to mount attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets, 
justifying them variously as deterring attacks on Lebanon,36 as exerting pressure 
on Israel to release Lebanese prisoners, and as a part of the efort to ‘liberate’ 
the disputed Shebaa Farms.37 Hezbollah’s tactics included attempts to kidnap IDF 
soldiers, iring mortar shells and anti-tank missiles, and laying roadside charges.38 
The IDF top brass were split between those who thought the Israeli response 
should be ierce, in line with Barak’s earlier emphasis on deterrence, and those 
who supported a defensive posture owing to the low level of civilian and military 
casualties Israel had sustained since the 2000 withdrawal:39 losses had fallen from 
some 17 soldiers a year during 1985–2000 to a total of 17 between 2000 and 2006.40 
Successive Israeli governments—under Barak, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert 
(until July 2006)—sided with the ‘defensive’ school of thought, thereby eroding 
the deterrence component in Israel’s foreign policy towards Hezbollah.
What, then, was Israel’s foreign policy towards Hezbollah from 2000 to 2006, 
and to what extent did it exhibit the transferable principles of containment? Both 
Kennan and US strategists after the Cold War deemed either accommodation or 
appeasement of the USSR or rogue states, respectively, unviable. Similarly, for 
Israel, appeasement, accommodation and political dialogue were unviable in the 
face of Hezbollah’s staunch anti-Zionist and anti-Judaic stance,41 its long-standing 
conlict with Israel and its close relations with Iran.
Kennan had assumed that total war would be dangerous, even deadly, for the 
United States, and US strategists felt full-blown conlict with a rogue state to be 
extremely undesirable. Likewise, total war with Hezbollah was seen as perilous 
by Israel’s government. With the second Palestinian intifada under way, the 
Barak and Sharon governments were reluctant to open a second front in northern 
Israel—not least because it would probably result in Hezbollah’s launching wide-
scale rocket attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets, against which Israel had 
no efective means of defence. In addition, rocket attacks would have undermined 
the economic and security improvements experienced in northern Israel since the 
withdrawal from Lebanon.42 Thus, in a fashion similar to US containment policy, 
Israel’s policy towards Hezbollah was a third way between unviable accommoda-
tion and undesirable war.
Another principle of containment relected in Israel’s foreign policy towards 
Hezbollah was exacerbation of the opponent’s internal contradictions. Hezbollah’s 
36 D. Sobelman, ‘Four years after the withdrawal from Lebanon: reining the rules of the game’, Strategic 
Assessment 7: 2, 2004, p. 2, http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=25&incat=&read=29, accessed 17 May 
2012. 
37 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: a short history (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 
92–3.
38 For details, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Main events on the Israeli–Lebanese border since the 
IDF withdrawal’, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/8/Main%20Events%20on%20
the%20Israel-Lebanese%20Border%20since%20th, accessed 17 May 2012.
39 Dan Halutz, testimony before the Winograd Commission, p. 9; Winograd Commission, Interim report, p. 47.
40 Data obtained from Bregman, Israel’s wars, p. 261. 
41 On these features, see  Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: politics and religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002) , pp. 
134–87. 
42 On both points, see Barak, testimony before the Winograd Commission, p. 8; Ben-Eliezer, testimony before 
the Winograd Commission, p. 3; Harel and Issacharof, Spider webs, p. 75.
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internal tensions derived from two parallel processes in the movement. From the 
late 1980s, Hezbollah had tried to integrate with Lebanon’s political institutions, 
while its identity and practice remained based on the notion of an armed resist-
ance movement struggling against Israel and the West.43 Until Israel’s withdrawal 
in 2000, Hezbollah’s political integration and insistence on militancy were 
 reconcilable, perhaps even mutually reinforcing. The armed struggle bolstered 
Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon’s Shi’i community and strengthened its position in 
Lebanese public opinion. The Lebanese government oicially endorsed  Hezbollah’s 
continued resistance to Israeli occupation of south Lebanon as a national resistance 
efort, not just as representing Hezbollah’s own aspirations and material interests.44
Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon prompted a change in this situation. Since 
Hezbollah’s military activity had achieved its goal of Israeli withdrawal, various 
groups in Lebanon called on Hezbollah to halt its attacks on Israel, and to 
disarm.45 This internal pressure was compounded by external demands. Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 of September 2004, initiated by the United 
States and France, called for a ‘disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and 
non-Lebanese militias’.46 Thus, whereas during the years of the Security Zone 
Hezbollah’s military attacks against Israel were congruent with its establishment 
as a political force in Lebanon, from 2000 tensions between the two strands of its 
purpose developed.
Israel’s then defence minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, and Sharon’s Chief of 
Staf, Dov Weisglass, along with the Winograd Commission and independent 
journalistic sources, conirmed that, like containment, Israel’s policy was to 
exacerbate these tensions by depriving Hezbollah of legitimacy (which conlict 
escalation would have aforded) to continue its attacks on Israel.47 Accordingly, 
large-scale military force was reduced and engagements with Hezbollah were 
more often responses to an attack. Reprisals generally were limited to artillery 
and air strikes on Hezbollah and Syrian targets, and reconnaissance lights over 
Lebanon. To minimize friction, the IDF was ordered to withdraw its units from 
the international border and deploy them in rearguard positions.48
However, in some respects Israel’s foreign policy towards Hezbollah diverted 
from the transferable principles of containment. Kennan stressed that  containment 
43 On these two elements of Hezbollah’s identity and practice, see Eyal Zisser, ‘Hizballah: between armed 
struggle and domestic politics’, in Barry Rubin, ed., Revolutionaries and reformers: contemporary Islamic movements 
in the Middle East (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003); Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah, pp. 
16–34.
44 Zisser, ‘Hizballah’, pp. 91–6; Krista E. Wiegand, ‘Reformation of a terrorist group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese 
political party’, Studies in Conlict and Terrorism 32: 8, 2009, p. 675.
45 See e.g. Gibran Tueni, quoted in Norton, Hezbollah, p. 118; Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Lebanese Druze, and 
Al-Mustakbal, the newspaper of Lebanon’s then prime minister, Raiq al-Hariri, also criticized Hezbollah. See 
Eyal Zisser, ‘Hizballah and Israel: strategic threat on the northern border’, Israel Afairs 12: 1, 2006, p. 98.
46 UN Security Council Resolution 1559, http://daccess-dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/
PDF/N0449892.pdf?OpenElement, accessed May 2012.  
47 D. Weisglass, testimony before the Winograd Commission, pp. 19–20; B. Ben-Eliezer, testimony before the 
Winograd Commission, pp. 3–4; Winograd Commission, Interim report, pp. 39, 45–6; Harel and Issacharof, 
Spider webs, pp. 75–6.
48 On the limited use of force, see Winograd Commission, Interim report, pp. 46–9; Harel and Issacharof, Spider 
webs, pp. 69–77, 136–9; Daniel Sobelman, ‘New rules of the game: Israel and Hezbollah after the withdrawal 
from Lebanon’, memorandum no. 69 (Tel Aviv: Jafe Centre for Strategic Studies, 2004).
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involved pressure exerted by multiple foreign policy tools, in order to generate 
political change in an adversary. But the foreign policy tools Israel could employ 
towards Hezbollah, and the ability to generate political change in the movement, 
were limited. Israel’s botched attempt to install Bashir Gemayel as Lebanon’s 
president in 1982, and its desertion of the South Lebanon Army, rendered Israeli 
attempts at political engineering in Lebanon inefective. Consequently, Israel was 
unable to exploit the diferences that were emerging between Hezbollah and other 
political groups in Lebanon, or to employ economic carrots and sticks towards 
Hezbollah. Personal considerations also had a limiting efect. Barak could not aford 
an escalation of conlict across the northern border since this would question his 
judgement that unilaterally withdrawing the IDF from Lebanon would improve 
Israel’s security. Sharon, who had been indicted by the Kahane Commission for 
his role in Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, also adopted a cautious approach to 
Hezbollah.49
Notwithstanding the diminution, noted above, of the frequency and lethality 
of Hezbollah’s attacks following the unilateral withdrawal, by 2006 Israeli foreign 
policy-makers deemed the impact of limited containment to be weakening; 
it lacked a deterrence component and its legitimacy base was being eroded by 
Hezbollah’s repeated violations of UNSCR 1559.50 The assault Hezbollah carried 
out on 12 July 2006—involving the deaths of three Israeli soldiers, the kidnap of 
two others, and the shelling of civil and military targets within Israeli sovereign 
territory—was seen by Israeli foreign policy-makers as epitomizing the increas-
ingly weak impact of limited containment.51
Nonetheless, as documented by the accounts of the debates determining the 
response to the 12 July assault by Hezbollah, the Israeli reaction did not entail 
abandoning containment and replacing it with war. Rather, the government 
authorized the IDF to launch a ierce but limited campaign52—not war—aimed 
at achieving two goals:53 irst, reinforcing the legitimacy base of limited contain-
ment by putting pressure on the international community to demand, and on 
Hezbollah to accept, implementation of UNSCR 1559,54 and second, re-estab-
lishing Israeli deterrence.55 Deterrence would be achieved via punishment—
using military force ofensively to ‘persuade an opponent that the risk/cost of an 
undesirable action will exceed any possible gains’.56 Thus Prime Minister Olmert 
stated in concluding the government meeting authorizing the military response: 
49 On the impact of personal factors, see Winograd Commission, Interim report, p. 45; Weisglass, testimony before 
the Winograd Commission, p. 13.
50 Dan Haloutz, testimony before the Winograd Commission, pp. 9–12; Dan Haloutz, Straightforward (Tel Aviv: 
Yediot Ahronot, 2010), pp. 360–61; Amir Peretz, testimony to the Winograd Commission, pp. 15–16.
51 Winograd Commission, Interim report, pp. 67–8.
52 Ehud Olmert, testimony to the Winograd Commission, pp. 35–40; Tzipi Livni, testimony to the Winograd 
Commission, pp. 6, 11, 32, 45; Dan Haloutz, testimony to the Winograd Commission, p. 50; Amir Peretz, 
testimony to the Winograd Commission, p. 36. 
53 Peretz, testimony to the Winograd Commission, pp. 70–104. 
54 Olmert, testimony to the Winograd Commission, p. 10. 
55 Peretz, testimony to the Winograd Commission, pp. 17–18; Winograd Commission, Interim report, pp. 70, 77, 
87; Haloutz, testimony to the Winograd Commission, p. 10.
56 Deinition derived from Amir Lupovici, ‘The emerging fourth debate of deterrence theory: toward a new 
research agenda’, International Studies Quarterly 54: 3, 2010, p. 706, n. 4.
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‘We need to exact such a price tag [from Hezbollah] that no one will want to mess 
with us.’57
However, owing to lawed implementation the campaign snowballed into 
full-blown conlict;58 even so, in line with the original aims, this produced a 
containing efect rather than marking the end of containment and its replace-
ment by war. Between August 2006 and the time of writing, Hezbollah has not 
launched a single ofensive against Israel, despite restoration of its military capabil-
ities, failure to ‘liberate’ the Shebaa Farms, and accusations that Israel had assassi-
nated  Hezbollah’s former chief of staf, Imad Mughniyeh, that prompted avowals 
to avenge his death.
In terms of the principles of containment, Hezbollah’s mellowed behaviour 
is attributed to two factors. The irst is the enhanced element of deterrence in 
Israel’s policy of containment, as relected in comments made by Hasan Nasseralla, 
general secretary of Hezbollah, immediately after the 2006 conlict, to the efect 
that ‘had he anticipated Israel’s response to the 12 July attack, he would not have 
authorized this assault’.59 Other factors, for example related to Lebanese domestic 
politics, and to Iran and Syria, may have had an impact on Hezbollah’s inaction 
towards Israel, which is unprecedented since the organization was established in 
1982. However, these factors were constant throughout the period 2000–2006, 
and yet did not produce the inaction by Hezbollah witnessed following the use of 
force in the 2006 conlict, suggesting that that use of force played a decisive role 
in producing the containing efect on Hezbollah’s behaviour. Second, annual UN 
monitoring reports demonstrate that the legitimacy base of Israel’s foreign policy 
of containment, in the form of UNSCR 1701, is far more robust than before July 
2006 under UNSCR 1559,60 reinforcing what Barak termed the invisible barrier 
(of legitimacy) between the IDF and Hezbollah forces.
Containing Hamas
Hamas’s victory in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary and legisla-
tive elections resulted in a situation of dual power in the occupied territories.61 
Fatah, Hamas’s main rival, retained control over the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
presidency, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the PA security 
forces—the chief source of formal power within the PA. Hamas gained control 
over the Palestinian Council and the PA government,62 enabling it to extend 
57 Winograd Commission, Interim report, p. 80.
58 Avi Kober, ‘The Israeli Defence Forces in the second Lebanon war: why the poor performance?’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies 31: 1, 2008, pp. 3–40; Efraim Inbar, ‘How Israel bungled the second Lebanon war’, Middle East Quarterly 14: 
3, 2007, http://www.meforum.org/1686/how-israel-bungled-the-second-lebanon-war, accessed 17 May 2012.
59 Al-Mannar, 27 Aug. 2006. 
60 For the most recent report see ‘Fifteenth report of the secretary-general on the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1701’, 2011, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/iles/resources/3F3811AFDE8430C78
525784E007C8BE6-Full_Report.pdf, accessed 17 May 2012.
61 On the elections, see As’ad Ghanem, Palestinian politics after Arafat (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2009), pp. 122–34.
62 International Crisis Group (ICG), Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: pulling back from the brink, Middle East 
Report no. 54 (Brussels: 2006), p. 1.
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its international footprint. Hamas’s leaders engaged with international public 
opinion via Arab, Israeli and western media outlets.63 In addition, in bypassing the 
PLO, Hamas sought to conduct oicial diplomacy on behalf of the Palestinians 
with those states that recognized its government.64 Mahmoud al-Zahar, Hamas’s 
foreign minister, corresponded with the UN secretary general over the Hamas-led 
government’s relationship with Israel.65 However, Hamas refused to accept the 
conditions set by the Quartet (US, UN, Russia and EU) for continued assistance to 
the PA government, namely: renunciation of violence against Israel, recognition 
of Israel’s right to exist, and acceptance of the Israel–PLO peace agreements.66
The Israeli government that took oice in March 2006, led by Ehud Olmert’s 
Kadima party, was tasked with formulating foreign policy towards the Hamas-led 
PA government.67 At the time,   the government’s policy was informed by Israel’s 
previous unilateral withdrawals from south Lebanon and the Gaza Strip (the latter 
in August 2005). The Olmert government sought to implement the ‘conver-
gence plan’, which entailed another unilateral withdrawal, from the West Bank, 
within 18 months, should the Hamas-led government not accept the Quartet’s 
 conditions.68
What was Israel’s policy in the interim and to what extent did it exhibit 
the transferable principles of containment? The option of accommodation was 
unviable because Israel’s condition for negotiation was that Hamas should accept 
the Quartet’s conditions.69 This Hamas could not do without backtracking polit-
ically and risking internal division.70 The other option, of full-blown conlict 
with the Hamas-led government, was deemed perilous. A possible humanitarian 
crisis or the PA’s collapse would have led to the resumption of full-scale violence, 
enforced Israel’s assumption of responsibility for the ungoverned territories, and 
provoked an extremely hostile international response.71 Thus, like containment, 
Israel’s policy towards Hamas was an alternative to accommodation and war.
Israeli policy further corresponded to Kennan’s formulation in that Israel 
employed measures short of war by implementing containment. Israel coordinated a 
63 See e.g. Lally Weymouth, ‘A conversation with Ismail Haniyeh’, Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2006, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/24/AR2006022402317.html, accessed 17 May 2012; 
Danny Rubenstein, ‘Hamas PM Haniyeh: retreat to 1967 borders will bring peace’, Haaretz, 23 May 2006.
64 These included Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
Turkey: ICG, Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet, p. 2. 
65 ICG, Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet, p. 4.
66 ‘Statement of the Quartet: the new Palestinian government’, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/
article_5865_en.htm, accessed 17 May 2012.
 67 Chris McGreal, ‘Kadima wins Israel’s elections as Likud humiliated’, Guardian, 29 March 2006, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2006/mar/29/israel1, accessed 17 May 2012.
68 Ehud Olmert, address by interim Prime Minister on presenting the new government to the Knesset, 4 May 
2006, http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2006/05/speechkness040506.htm; Ahiya Raved, 
‘Oicial: realignment methods unlike Gaza’ (interview with architect of disengagement Eival Giladi), http://
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3257132,00.html, both accessed 17 May 2012.
69 Israeli cabinet communiqué, 19 Feb. 2006, Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Government/Communiques/2006/Cabinet+Communique+19-Feb-2006.htm, accessed 17 May 2012.
70 On this point, see Are Hovdenak, ‘Hamas in transition: the failure of sanctions’, Democratization 61: 1, 2009, 
p. 71. 
71 ICG, Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet, p. 24.
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diplomatic embargo with the European Union and the United States.72 It also used 
economic means: freezes on taxes, tarifs and other fees collected on behalf of the 
PA and transferred monthly.73 Quartet envoy and former World Bank president 
James Wolfensohn estimated that this measure alone reduced the PA’s revenue by 
30 per cent.74 Restrictions at the crossing points with Gaza were tightened, Gazan 
workers were banned from entering Israel, and the customs envelope allowing 
goods from Gaza and the West Bank to enter Israel was closed. The impact of 
Israel’s economic measures was exacerbated by the US and EU severing economic 
ties with the Hamas-led PA government, resulting in signiicant foreign aid reduc-
tions and restrictions on the banks dealing with the PA, making transfer of the 
(diminishing) available funds to the PA and the Palestinians extremely di cult.75 
Economic and diplomatic pressures were compounded by the use of military force, 
including targeted killings and arrests of Hamas members, and intermittent incur-
sions into, and artillery bombardments of, Gaza. The main incursions included 
Operation Southern Arrow (launched 4 April 2006) and Operation Summer Rains 
(launched 27 June 2006, following the kidnap of Corporal Gilad Shalit).76
While the pressure from Israel was severe, it was not designed materially to 
destroy the Hamas-led regime: amid rocket attacks in the western Negev, and 
periodic suicide bombings, Israel’s top brass resisted calls to topple the Hamas 
government and/or reoccupy Gaza.77 Also, despite the severe economic restric-
tions, Israel allowed foreign agencies to provide aid that would prevent complete 
economic meltdown. It actively courted UN agencies aiding the Palestinians, 
inanced a UN institution in Gaza and, together with the US and others, backed 
expansion of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), long a 
target of Israeli criticism.78
Recalling the transferable principles of containment helps to explain the 
goals Israel might have hoped to achieve through this policy. Kennan believed 
that political and military containment was achievable through pressure exerted 
via multiple foreign policy tools designed to exacerbate the adversary’s internal 
contradictions. For Hamas, the further its political identity and practice veered 
from the Quartet’s conditions, the greater the material challenge to its ability to 
govern, and vice versa. In terms of the transferable principles of containment, 
Israel’s foreign policy is conceived here as designed to exacerbate this tension in 
order to reduce the military challenge—deined in terms of scope, frequency and 
lethality of attacks—posed by Hamas. Like the stance adopted towards Hezbollah 
in the same period, Israel’s foreign policy towards Hamas was initially one of 
limited containment.
72 See Israeli cabinet communiqués, 19 Feb. and 9 April 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Communiques/2006/Cabinet+Communique+9-Apr-2006.htm?DisplayMode=print, accessed May 2012. 
73 Israeli cabinet communiqué, 19 Feb. 2006.
74 Quoted in ICG, Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet, p. 22.
75 Michelle Esposito, ‘Quarterly update on conlict and diplomacy’, Journal of Palestine Studies 35: 4, 2006, pp. 
101–104.
76 Esposito, ‘Quarterly update’, pp. 103–11.
77 Amos Harel, ‘Halutz: IDF reoccupation of Gaza will not end Qassam rocket ire’, Haaretz, 2 May 2006.
78 ICG, Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet, p. 25.
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However, the conlict between Israel and Hezbollah of July–August 2006 
prompted the Israeli government to halt plans for another unilateral act and to 
use limited containment as an interim measure.79 Retired military generals, politi-
cians, and the public drew the link between the eruption of war, its outcome, 
and Israel’s unilateral withdrawals from south Lebanon and Gaza.80 Critics argued 
that, contrary to the promises made by the Barak, Sharon and Olmert govern-
ments, Israel’s unilateralist measures yielded neither political nor security gains, 
but rather exacerbated Israel’s security challenges.
Israeli declarations and actions following the abandonment of unilateralism 
relect a subtle yet signiicant shift in Israel’s foreign policy towards Hamas. In 
an important policy speech, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni clariied that Israeli 
foreign policy since August 2006 was aimed at reducing the security challenge 
posed by Hamas and exerting pressure to achieve a speciic balance: promoting 
regime change in the PA through elections and/or a shift in Hamas’s stance, 
but without, in the process, destroying the PA’s institutions. Livni emphasized 
that changes in Hamas’s behaviour would be measured by its acceptance of the 
Quartet’s  conditions.81
Israel’s use of economic, military and diplomatic foreign policy tools relects the 
aims and balance outlined by Livni. The economic sanctions (including banking 
constraints) imposed on the Hamas-led PA government by the US and EU, and 
the blockade on Gaza, were maintained.82 However, Israel also approved measures 
designed to avert humanitarian disaster and prevent the collapse of the PA, such 
as the EU’s Temporary International Mechanism (TIM): a inancial construct 
allowing money to be channelled to the Palestinians, bypassing the Hamas govern-
ment and its institutions.83
The balance Israel sought between generating political change and preventing 
collapse of the PA was also relected in its use of military force.84 The IDF contin-
 ued to ire artillery, carry out air raids and intermittent incursions into Gaza, 
and assassinate and arrest Hamas members. Hamas, in turn, continued its suicide 
bombings (although with less frequency) and ired rockets on Israeli towns and 
villages. But instead of these skirmishes escalating into war, military confronta-
tion between Israel and Hamas followed a predictable, contained pattern: ighting 
79 Yossi Verter, ‘Convergence no longer on the agenda, PM tells ministers’, Haaretz, 18 Aug. 2006.
80 See e.g. former chief of staf Moshe Ya’alon, The longer shorter way (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2008), pp. 155–67. 
Maj.-Gen. Yiftah Ron-Tal described withdrawal from Gaza as ‘suicide for Israel’. See Hanan Greenberg, 
‘Oicer’s criticism of army stirs row’, Ynet, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3310855,00.html, 
accessed 17 May 2012. The chairman of the Foreign Afairs and Defense Committee, Tzahi Hanegbi, claimed 
that the Gaza pullout prompted the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war: Ilan Marciano, ‘Hanegbi: pullout prompted 
Lebanon war’, Ynet, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3311505,00.html, accessed 17 May 2012.
81 Foreign Minister Livni’s address to the Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 24 June 2007, http://www.mfa.
gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2007/Address+by+FM+Livni+to+the+Israel+Council 
+of+Foreign+Relations+24-Ju-2007.htm, accessed 17 May 2012. 
82 Esposito, ‘Quarterly update’, p. 141.
83 On the TIM, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Statement by the Middle East Quartet’, 20 Sept. 2006, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Statement+by+the+Middle+East+ 
Quartet+20-Sep-2006.htm, accessed 17 May 2012.
84 See statements by Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister Peretz in Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, 
cabinet communiqué, 5 Nov. 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/Cabinet 
+Communique+5-Nov-2006.htm, accessed 17 May 2012.
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was conined mainly to West Negev and Gaza, and was not continuous but inter-
spersed with periods of ceaseire.85
In relation to containment’s transferable principles, the change in Israel’s 
foreign policy demonstrates that with the abandonment of unilateralism Israeli 
foreign policy underwent a shift from a form of limited containment to comprehen-
sive containment: keeping the opponent’s political inluence and military challenge 
within deined limits and using containment to generate political change in the 
opponent, while employing multiple foreign policy tools.
This shift to comprehensive containment was relected not just in how diplo-
matic, economic and military pressure was used to inluence Hamas. In the 
context of the communist movement, Kennan argued that encouraging fractures 
was crucial in order to highlight the USSR’s internal contradictions. Similarly, 
Israel, backed by the US and the EU, sought to create issures in the Palestinian 
national movement. The distinction between Abbas and his Fatah party, branded 
‘moderates’, and Hamas, rendered as ‘extremist’, was central to this efort.86 These 
classiications were not just a matter of semantics, for they translated into material 
support for Fatah: US$100 million worth of tax revenues held by Israel was trans-
ferred via the PA presidential oice.87 Also, Israel and the United States agreed to 
bolster Abbas’s security forces to counter Hamas’s military capability, especially 
the recently formed Executive Security Force.88
The shift in Israel’s foreign policy towards Hamas from limited to compre-
hensive containment was temporarily put on hold following the February 2007 
Mecca Accord between Fatah and Hamas, which involved the formation of a 
Palestinian National Unity Government (PNUG).89 Various countries supported 
85 Three key periods can be identiied: between the kidnapping of Corporal Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006 and 
the 26 November 2006 ceaseire; between April 2007 and the June 2008 ceaseire. See ‘Hamas militants declare 
end to cease ire with Israel’, New York Times, 24 April 2007; ‘Israel and Hamas ceaseire begins’, BBC, 19 
June 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7462554.stm, accessed 17 May 2012. The ceaseire 
was interrupted, but did not break down, when Israel killed six Hamas gunmen on 5 November 2008. See 
Rory Mcarthy, ‘Gaza truce broken as Israeli raids kill six Hamas gunmen’, Guardian, 5 Nov. 2008, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/05/israelandthepalestinians’, accessed 17 May 2012. Hamas formally 
ended the truce in December 2008 by resuming rocket ire on the western Negev, prompting Israel to launch 
Operation Cast Lead. See James Hider, ‘Hamas says it will not renew cease ire’, The Times, http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5367679.ece, accessed 20 Aug. 2010.
86 After November–December 2006 the moderates/extremists rhetoric was conspicuous. See e.g. Israel Ministry 
of Foreign Afairs, ‘Press conference by Foreign Minister Livni and Egyptian Foreign Minister Gheit’, 27 Dec. 
2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Foreign+Minister+Livni/Speeches+interviews/Press 
%20Conference%20by%20FM%20Livni%20and%20Egyptian%20FM%20Gheit%2027-Dec-2006, accessed 17 
May 2012.
87 Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, cabinet communiqué, 24 Dec. 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Government/Communiques/2006/Cabinet%20Communique%2024-Dec-2006, accessed 17 May 2012. 
The efort was coordinated with the US, which in October 2006 transferred US$42 million to help Abbas 
restructure and retrain Fatah in the face of possible elections against Hamas. See Esposito, ‘Quarterly update’, 
p. 126.
88 The US, with Israel’s agreement, ofered to inance enlargement of Abbas’s elite presidential guard from 3,000 
to 6,000, and in January 2007 Congress approved a US$86.3 million assistance package. See US Department 
of State, ‘Congressional notiication transmittal sheet’, June 2007, quoted in ICG, After Gaza, Middle East 
Report no. 68 (Brussels, Aug. 2007), p. 9.
89 For a text of the agreement see http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=690, accessed 17 May 
2012.
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the PNUG,90 though Israel regarded it as a setback.91 However, tensions between 
Fatah and Hamas over who would control the Palestinian security forces persisted, 
culminating in Hamas’s military takeover of Gaza on 14 June 2007, after which 
President Abbas dissolved the PNUG.92
Israel’s foreign policy towards Hamas after the collapse of the PNUG relects a 
more pronounced shift from limited to comprehensive containment—manifested, 
for example, by Israel’s greater use of the pre-Mecca Accord tactic of widening 
the cracks within the Palestinian national movement. Prime Minister Olmert 
stated that ‘a clear distinction could be made between Hamas “extremists” and 
Fatah-dominated PA “moderates”’,93 and Foreign Minister Livni announced 
that the international community and Israel should bolster the moderates by 
providing ‘money [and] arms, easing conditions, [and] opening border cross-
ings’.94 Relecting the efort to deepen the divisions within the Palestinian national 
movement, in September 2007 Gaza was declared a ‘hostile entity controlled by a 
terrorist organisation’.95
Another manifestation of the same shift was the further exacerbation of 
the internal contradiction Hamas faced following its 2006 election victory: the 
increasing material challenge to its ability to govern entailed by its refusal to 
accept the Quartet’s conditions. To achieve this, Israel increased its pressure on 
Hamas and the territory it sought to control in Gaza, with the aim, according to 
Israeli foreign policy-makers, of ‘weaken[ing] Hamas to the point that it would be 
ousted by the Palestinians’.96 To this end, Israel increased its use of military force 
towards Gaza.97 Fighting waxed and waned, but although it was still conined 
mainly to Gaza and the western Negev, the overall trajectory in the Israel–Hamas 
military confrontation between June 2007 and December 2008 was towards inten-
siied conlict.98 Simultaneously, Israel maintained its economic sanctions on 
Hamas and enforced tighter closure of Gaza, which, according to the Palestinian 
90 For example, Norway, Qatar and Saudi Arabia jointly transferred an estimated US$160 million to the PA. 
Even the US transferred funds to a PLO account managed by the then inance minister Salam Fayad. ICG, 
After Gaza, p. 3. 
91 Foreign Minister Livni, address to the Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 24 June 2007.
92 For details on the Mecca Agreement, see ICG, ‘After Gaza’, pp. 2–15.
93 See e.g. Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Statement by PM Ehud Olmert at the Sharm el-Sheik summit’, 
25 June 2007, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2007/Statement+by+P
M+Ehud+Olmert+at+the+Sharm+el-Sheikh+Summit+25-Jun-2007.htm; press statement by Foreign Minister 
Livni at the EU General Afairs and External Relations Council, 18 June 2007, Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Afairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2007/Press+statement+by+
FM+Livni+at+the+EU+General+Afairs+and+External+Relations+Council+18-Jun-2007.htm, both accessed 
17 May 2012.
94 Foreign Minister Livni, address to the Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 24 June 2007.
95 Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Security cabinet declares Gaza hostile territory’, 19 Sept. 2007, http://
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Security+Cabinet+declares+Gaza+hostile+ 
territory+19-Sep-2007.htm, accessed 17 May 2012.
96 Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Brieing by Foreign Minister Livni to the Diplomatic Corps’, 3 March 
2008, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2008/Brieing+by+FM+Livni
+to+the+Diplomatic+Corps+3-Mar-2008.htm?DisplayMode=print, accessed 17 May 2012.
97 On this trend, see ‘Anti-Israeli terrorism in 2007 and its trends in 2008’ (Ramat Ha-Sharon: Intelligence and 
Terrorism Information Centre at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Communication Centre, 2008); ‘Israeli 
military operations against Gaza 2000–2008’, Journal of Palestine Studies 38: 3, 2009, p. 137.
98 After prolonged military clashes between April 2007 and June 2008 a ceaseire was signed and maintained until 
December 2008. See ‘Israel and Hamas ceaseire begins’, BBC, 19 June 2008.
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trade centre and the World Bank, experienced a dramatic slowdown in economic 
activity. 99
A third manifestation involved Israel’s attempts to create in the West Bank an 
alternative socio-economic and political model to that of Hamas in Gaza. Israel’s 
policy-makers described it as creating a political horizon, and Livni commented 
that it made it ‘possible for the moderate elements to come to the Palestinian 
people and say, “we are the only ones who can, in addition to immediate relief, 
also give you a future, a future of peace, with a state of our own, a future in which 
we can make progress with Israel”’.100 Several measures were used to create this 
alternative socio-economic model, including encouraging West Bank trade with 
Israel and neighbouring countries; supporting infrastructure projects that could 
be rapidly implemented and would have long-term impact; and facilitating regular 
transfers of the tax and VAT revenues withheld by Israel from the PA since 2006.101 
Donor countries complemented these actions with pledges to the PA totalling 
US$7.4 billion, to be disbursed over three years.102 Actions were taken to consoli-
date the PA’s security forces, including strengthening civil security forces; organ-
izing, training and upgrading the Palestinian National Security Forces (PNSF) 
(undertaken by US envoy General Keith Dayton); and an international initiative 
to train four PNSF battalions in Jordan.103
While Israel hailed these measures as huge successes, the World Bank summa-
rized the period from June 2007 to irst quarter 2009 less positively:
In [the current] policy environment and pending a political resolution to the conlict, aid 
should be recognised for what it is—more of a stabilising measure, slowing down socio-
economic decline, than a catalyst for sustainable economic development. Large amounts 
of donor aid have produced insigniicant growth and an increase in economic dependency, 
despite the consistent improvement in PA governance and security.104
Even were the change in the West Bank as modest as the World Bank claimed, it 
was an alternative to what Gazans had been experiencing: sanctions on Hamas, 
closure, ierce ighting and high death tolls. As such, the policy of propping up 
the West Bank relected another transferable principle of containment. Kennan 
attributed great importance to the creation in Europe of alternative and more 
99 ‘Gaza Strip: a year through siege’, Palestine Trade Centre, 14 July 2008, http://www.paltrade.org/en/
publications/EN_A_Year_Through_Siege.pdf; World Bank, Palestinian economic prospects: aid, access and reform. 
Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, Sept. 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCReportSept.08inal.pdf, both accessed 17 May 2012.
100  Foreign Minister Livni’s address to the Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 24 June 2007, http://www.mfa.
gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2007/Address+by+FM+Livni+to+the+Israel+Council 
+of+Foreign+Relations+24-Ju-2007.htm, accessed 23 May 2012. 
101 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Report of the Government of Israel to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee: 
supporting Palestinian capacity building. Israel’s eforts in supporting the Palestinian economy, security 
reforms and civil afairs’ ( Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Afairs, 2009), pp. 6–17. 
102 Reuters, ‘Donors pledge $7.4 billion to Palestinians’, 17 Dec. 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS 
L1670303120071217, accessed 9 July 2010. 
103 Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Report of the Government of Israel to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee’, 
pp. 18–25.
104 World Bank, Palestinian economic prospects: Gaza recovery and West Bank revival. Economic Monitoring Report to 
the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, June 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/
Resources/AHLCJune09Reportinal.pdf, accessed 17 May 2012. 
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successful models than the USSR, believing this would expose the deiciencies of 
the USSR and erode the regime’s legitimacy. Similarly, Israel sought to create in 
the West Bank an alternative socio-economic and political reality to that in Gaza. 
Of course, the context was far removed from that of ideological competition 
between communism and capitalism. Nevertheless, Israel’s foreign policy tools 
were employed in the context of a competition between two political approaches 
to leading the Palestinian national movement and conducting its external relations: 
on the one hand, the combination of political Islam and ‘resistance’ to Israel and 
the West ofered by Hamas; on the other hand, the mixture of state-building 
and engagement with Israel and the West proposed by the Fatah-led PA. In this 
context, Israel’s policy is perceived as designed to undermine the legitimacy and 
credibility of the political programme ofered by the contained entity, Hamas, by 
shoring up its rival, Fatah, and the political alternative it represented.
Hamas responded to Israel’s three-pronged policy of comprehensive contain-
ment by iring more and longer-range rockets on Israeli towns and villages,105 and 
highlighting the human toll exacted by Israel’s foreign policy of comprehensive 
containment. On the night of 22 January 2008 Hamas militants set of a series of 
explosions along the border wall with Egypt, allowing a human wave to surge 
across the frontier into Egypt. This mass of people streaming through the broken 
wall to stock up on basic supplies highlighted the plight of Gaza as a result of 
Israeli measures.106
Israel’s comprehensive containment and Hamas’s response are worth consid-
ering in the light of the discussion earlier in this article on the role of legitimacy 
as a component of containment towards the USSR and its absence in US contain-
ment of Iraq. Israel’s policy of comprehensive containment was similarly under-
mined by Hamas’s ability to reduce the legitimacy of that policy by highlighting 
the plight of Gazans, and by Israeli actions obstructing the longer-term Palestinian 
aspiration of statehood, for example the construction of settlements between 2007 
and 2009,107 and the paucity of conidence-building measures in the PA.108
We now turn to examine in terms of containment the Israeli decision to launch 
operation Cast Lead (December 2008 to January 2009) and its implementation. 
Operation Cast Lead was planned in advance, forming part of Israel’s broader 
strategy towards Hamas.109 Comments made in March 2008, prior to the launch 
105 In 2007, 896 rockets were ired on Israel. Between January and May 2008, 839 rockets were ired. See ‘Anti-
Israeli terrorism in 2007 and its trends in 2008’, p. 11. Following the ceaseire signed in June 2008 there was a 
sharp drop in attacks until it expired in December 2008.
106 See also the Hamas response to Israeli decision to reduce fuel supplies to Gaza: Yossi Alpher, ‘Gaza’s agency, 
Israel’s choice’, 29 Jan. 2008, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conlicts/gaza_s_agency_israel_s_
choice, accessed 17 May 2012.
107 Hagit Ofren, ‘The death of the settlement freeze: 4 months since Annapolis—March 2008’, Peace Now, http://
www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61&docid=3186&pos=11; Hagit Ofran, ‘Summary of con struc tion 
in the West Bank 2008’, Peace Now, http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61 &docid=3508&pos=9, 
both accessed 15 July 2010.
108 This was evident, for instance, in Israel’s extremely limited responses to PA requests to release Palestinian 
prisoners. For details see Michelle Esposito, ‘Quarterly update on conlict and diplomacy’, Journal of Palestine 
Studies 38: 2, 2009, p. 129.
109 See Report of the United Nations fact inding mission on the Gaza conlict (Goldstone Report), 2009, pp. 324–9; 
Statement by Defence Minister Barak, Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, 3 Jan. 2009, http://www.mfa.gov.
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of the operation, by Gadi Eisenkott, then Chief of the Northern Command, and 
other non-serving but well-placed military thinkers provide insights into the logic 
informing the use of military force in Operation Cast Lead.110 Speciically, there 
was a conviction that Hezbollah and Hamas could be deterred by inliction of 
punishment, destruction of assets and civilian infrastructures, and pressure on 
the civilian population through military activity. This conviction was articulated 
in the Dahiya doctrine—a plan developed and approved following the destruction 
wrought by the IDF on Hezbollah’s headquarters in Dahiya, south Beirut, during 
the 2006 conlict.111
The tactics used by the IDF during Operation Cast Lead relected the logic 
encapsulated in the Dahiya doctrine. Although independent sources have conirmed 
that Israel did not target civilians as a matter of policy,112 the military ofensive 
exerted immense pressure on the civilian population in Gaza. Palestinian deaths 
(mostly civilians) amounted to more than 1,300.113 Similarly, although there is a 
charged debate over the legality of Israeli attacks on private property and civilian 
infrastructure, the destruction of mosques, government buildings, UNRWA 
installations, and food production, water and sewage facilities is undisputed.114 
Indeed, Israeli air force data state that ‘99 percent of the iring that was carried 
out hit targets accurately’, meaning that the damage inlicted during the irst week 
of the aerial attacks was intentional not collateral.115 Intensive use of unarmed 
aerial vehicles during the ground phase of the operation suggests that high levels 
of accuracy in managing irepower were maintained.116 Crucially, although Israel 
deployed large ground forces in Gaza from the second week of the operation it 
did not, as a break from containment would require, attempt to reoccupy the area 
and topple the Hamas government.
Several statements made by key Israeli policy-makers during Operation Cast 
Lead relect the principles of the Dahiya doctrine and the aims Israel sought to 
achieve by the military tactics it pursued, linking massive use of ofensive military 
force to increasing Israeli deterrence via punishment. Most signiicantly among 
il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/Statement_DM_Ehud_Barak_3-Jan-2009.htm, accessed 18 May 
2012.
110 Reuters, ‘Israel warns Hizbullah war will invite destruction’, 10 March 2008, http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-3604893,00.html, accessed 18 May 2012; Giroa Eiland and Giora Eiland, ‘The third Lebanon 
war: target Lebanon’, Strategic Assessment 11: 2, Nov. 2008, pp. 9-17; Dr Mati Steinberg, former senior adviser 
to the Israeli General Security Service, quoted in Goldstone Report, p. 95.
111 Eisenkott, quoted in Goldstone Report, p. 254.




dth=135, accessed 18 May 2012.
113 Figures derived from Israeli NGO B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/20091227_a_year_to_
castlead_operation; http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20090909?DocId=917&, accessed 18 May 2012. 
These igures seem more accurate than the data provided by Israel and Hamas, which cite 1,100 Palestinian 
deaths and ascribe a larger proportion of the deaths to combatants.
114 For the debate, see Goldstone Report, pp. 17, 19, 105–15; Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Gaza operations 
investigations: second update’, http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/1483B296–7439–4217–933C-653CD19 
CE859/0/GazaUpdateJuly2010.pdf, accessed 16 January 2012. 
115 Quoted in Goldstone Report, p. 327.
116 Goldstone Report, p. 328.
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several declarations made during the operation,117 in a cabinet communiqué justi-
fying the end of the operation the government reiterated the aim of ‘creating 
deterrence against further terrorist attacks’ as a central objective of the operation. 
Furthermore, it stated that ‘the strikes have . . . created signiicant Israeli deter-
rence, the impact of which will become apparent after the Hamas leadership has 
surfaced and seen the extent of the damage done to its assets’.118 The signiicance 
of this communiqué lies in that, relecting the Dahiya doctrine, it makes a causal 
link between the damage inlicted on Hamas assets by the IDF and increasing 
Israeli deterrence towards the organization.
Following Operation Cast Lead the number of showcase terrorist attacks and 
the amount of mortar shell ire and rocket ire launched from the Gaza Strip 
decreased to an unprecedented low that lasted from 2006 to the time of writing.119 
It is interesting to explore this outcome in view of the discussion above about 
the transferability of containment, which would attribute Hamas’s mellowed 
behaviour to the increased deterrence component in Israel’s comprehensive 
containment policy after Cast Lead. Other factors, for example relations between 
Hamas and Egypt and internal Palestinian politics, may have also had an impact. 
However, these factors were constant throughout the 2006–2009 period, but did 
not produce the same drop in attacks by Hamas as that witnessed following the 
use of force in Operation Cast Lead,120 suggesting that the latter played a decisive 
role in producing the containing efect on Hamas’s behaviour. However, unlike 
Israel’s policy towards Hezbollah after 2006, Israel’s foreign policy towards Hamas 
following Cast Lead lacked international legitimacy. In fact, the huge human toll 
it exacted prompted ierce criticism from allies,121 international agencies122 and 
media outlets, thereby exacerbating the legitimacy deicit attaching to compre-
hensive containment since 2006. Consistent with Kennan’s formulation, this difer-
ence helps to explain why limited containment (towards Hezbollah), exhibiting an 
enhanced component of deterrence and a more robust legitimacy base, proved to 
be more efective after 2006 than comprehensive containment (towards Hamas), 
exhibiting a greater deterrence component but sufering from a legitimacy deicit.
117 See also Livni’s comments, quoted in Amos Harel, ‘Olmert: we won’t just defend against Gaza terror, we’ll 
attack’, Haaretz, 9 Dec 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/olmert-we-won-t-just-defend-
against-gaza-terror-we-ll-attack-1.259125; and in Kim Sengupta and Donald Macintyre, ‘Israeli cabinet divided 
over fresh Gaza surge’, Independent, 13 Jan. 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/
israeli-cabinet-divided-over-fresh-gaza-surge-1332024.html; see also comments made by Mike Herzog, chief 
of staf of Defence Minister Barak in the midst of the operation, quoted in Amir Oren, ‘Top aide to Barak: 
IDF aiming to stop Gaza rocket ire, not crush Hamas’, Haaretz, 1 Jan. 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/
top-aide-to-barak-idf-aiming-to-stop-gaza-rocket-ire-not-crush-hamas-1.267229, accessed 18 May 2012.
118 Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Behind the headlines: Israel holds its ire’, 18 Jan. 2009, http://www.mfa.
gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/Israel_holds_ire_18-Jan-2009, accessed 18 May 
2012.
119 Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Terrorism from the Gaza Strip since Operation Cast Lead: data, type, and 
trends’, 17 March 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against 
+Israel/Hamas_terror_organization_since_2009-March_2011.htm, accessed 18 May 2012. 
120 Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, ‘Terrorism from the Gaza Strip since Operation Cast Lead’.
121 e.g. Turkey: see Katerin Benhold, ‘Leaders of Turkey and Israel clash at Davos panel’, New York Times, 29 Jan. 
2009.
122 Though tempered by the retraction of Judge Goldstone in the Washington Post op-ed, the Goldstone Report 
still epitomizes the trend.
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Conclusion
In some respects, transfer of the principles of containment from state level to 
state/territorial TNA level is straightforward. Containment emerges as a third way 
between peace and total war. The rationale for containment is that the containing 
and contained entities have a common perception of risk; common aspirations to 
survive as political entities; and decision-making frameworks for managing and 
responding to containment. Under these conditions, containment can be directed 
towards diferent types of actors: a revolutionary state, one or more rogue states, 
or a territorial TNA such as Hezbollah or Hamas.
Precisely because Hamas and Hezbollah were perceived as rational actors 
capable of making decisions, Israeli policy sought to exacerbate their internal 
contradictions. In this respect, too, containment emerges as transferable from state 
level to the state/territorial TNA relationship. However, what enabled Israel to 
treat Hezbollah and Hamas as rational actors was not merely their status as terri-
torial TNA, but crucially their wish to integrate into the political institutions of 
their respective societies. This would suggest that containment cannot be applied 
to all territorial TNA; Al-Qaeda, for example, was based in Afghanistan prior to 
the 9/11 attacks, but did not aspire to establish a role for itself in government. It 
is rather the combination of being a territorial TNA and seeking to participate in 
political institutions that creates the conditions whereby a territorial TNA may be 
contained by exacerbating its international contradictions.
Likewise, the use of a massive military ofensive to bolster containment by 
enhancing its deterrence component through punishment was dependent on 
Hamas and Hezbollah being territorial TNAs and integrated in the political 
processes in their respective societies. Unlike the US replacement of containment 
with pre-emption and war, Israel’s massive military ofensives in 2006 and 2008 
were designed to enhance deterrence and produce a containing efect. The behav-
iour of Hezbollah and Hamas following these conlicts suggests that in this respect 
too Kennan’s formulation, in which the use of military force is integral to contain-
ment in enhancing deterrence and making political positions more credible, is 
transferable from the state level to the state/territorial TNA relationship.
In some respects, however, Israel’s containment of Hezbollah and Hamas 
difers from Kennan’s formulation. Territorial TNA, such as Hezbollah and 
Hamas, do not pose the same ideological challenge as was posed by the USSR to 
the US during the Cold War. We might ask: what was Israel seeking to contain? 
Following the Cold War, political containment of the revolutionary rival state, 
the USSR, was replaced by the rationale of containment to meet the challenges 
posed by rogue states to US national security. Israel’s foreign policy of limited 
and comprehensive containment, which was aimed at keeping within conines the 
security threats posed by Hezbollah and Hamas, suggests that this trend of using 
containment to deal with challenges to national security persisted when contain-
ment was employed towards territorial TNAs.
Another diference concerns the place of legitimacy as a component of contain-
ment. Kennan was preoccupied with the issue of legitimacy. However, given that 
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Soviet leadership was considered a worse alternative to US leadership, Kennan was 
concerned less with ‘international legitimacy’ than with consistent containment 
based on US domestic values. The US and Israeli experiences of containment 
towards, respectively, Iraq, and Hezbollah and Hamas, represent a reinement to 
Kennan’s thinking. By the late 1990s, the US policy of dual containment was 
coming under international scrutiny, especially on humanitarian grounds. The 
legitimacy of Israel’s comprehensive containment was tainted by failure to ofer 
the Palestinians what Livni termed a ‘political horizon’, and by the toll it took 
on Palestinians in Gaza, which attracted international criticism on humanitarian 
grounds.
The lack of legitimacy of Israel’s policy towards Hamas contrasted sharply with 
the emphasis on legitimacy in Israel’s limited containment of Hezbollah. Prime 
Minister Barak envisaged unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, in accordance 
with UN Resolution 425, as creating an ‘invisible barrier’ between Hezbollah and 
the IDF. This barrier may not have been impermeable, but surely was a major 
inluence on Hezbollah’s behaviour. Thus, although Israel did not take signiicant 
measures to increase its deterrence, during 2000–2006 Hezbollah attacks on Israeli 
targets decreased substantially. Since the end of the 2006 conlict and the passing 
of UNSCR 1701, Hezbollah has not carried out any attacks against Israel. These 
indings suggest that since the end of the Cold War, international legitimacy has a 
crucial bearing on the success of containment. In particular, when civilians sufer 
the impact of sanctions and military operations, international criticism on human-
itarian grounds will undermine the ability to contain the political inluence and 
military challenges posed by an opponent. Lack of legitimacy further reduces the 
capacity of containment to engineer the opponent’s downfall.
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